I have posted parts of this and linked to it before, but the same lies keep being repeated in a hope that they will be accepted as truth.

Original Intent and Purpose of the Second Amendment
Introduction

The Second Amendment:

A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.

The original intent and purpose of the Second Amendment was to preserve and guarantee, not grant, the pre-existing right of individuals to keep and bear arms. Although the amendment emphasizes the need for a militia, membership in any militia, let alone a well-regulated one, was not intended to serve as a prerequisite for exercising the right to keep arms.

The Second Amendment preserves and guarantees an individual right for a collective purpose. That does not transform the right into a "collective right." The militia clause was a declaration of purpose, and preserving the people's right to keep and bear arms was the method the framers chose to, in-part, ensure the continuation of a well-regulated militia.

There is no contrary evidence from the writings of the Founding Fathers, early American legal commentators, or pre-twentieth century Supreme Court decisions, indicating that the Second Amendment was intended to apply solely to active militia members.

Evidence of an Individual Right

In his popular edition of Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (1803), St. George Tucker (see also), a lawyer, Revolutionary War militia officer, legal scholar, and later a U.S. District Court judge (appointed by James Madison in 1813), wrote of the Second Amendment:

The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, and this without any qualification as to their condition or degree, as is the case in the British government.

In the appendix to the Commentaries, Tucker elaborates further:

This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty... The right of self-defense is the first law of nature; in most governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible. Whenever standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any color or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction. In England, the people have been disarmed, generally, under the specious pretext of preserving the game: a never failing lure to bring over the landed aristocracy to support any measure, under that mask, though calculated for very different purposes. True it is, their bill of rights seems at first view to counteract this policy: but the right of bearing arms is confined to protestants, and the words suitable to their condition and degree, have been interpreted to authorise the prohibition of keeping a gun or other engine for the destruction of game, to any farmer, or inferior tradesman, or other person not qualified to kill game. So that not one man in five hundred can keep a gun in his house without being subject to a penalty.

Not only are Tucker's remarks solid evidence that the militia clause was not intended to restrict the right to keep arms to active militia members, but he speaks of a broad right – Tucker specifically mentions self-defense.

"Because '[g]reat weight has always been attached, and very rightly attached, to contemporaneous exposition,' the Supreme Court has cited Tucker in over forty cases. One can find Tucker in the major cases of virtually every Supreme Court era." (Source: The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century)

(William Blackstone was an English jurist who published Commentaries on the Laws of England, in four volumes between 1765 and 1769. Blackstone is credited with laying the foundation of modern English law and certainly influenced the thinking of the American Founders.)

Another jurist contemporaneous to the Founders, William Rawle, authored "A View of the Constitution of the United States of America" (1829). His work was adopted as a constitutional law textbook at West Point and other institutions. In Chapter 10 he describes the scope of the Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms:

The prohibition is general. No clause in the constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived to give congress a power to disarm the people. Such a flagitious attempt could only be made under some general pretence by a state legislature. But if in any blind pursuit of inordinate power, either should attempt it, this amendment may be appealed to as a restraint on both.

This is another quote where it is obvious that "the people" refers to individuals since Rawle writes neither the states nor the national government has legitimate authority to disarm its citizens. This passage also makes it clear ("the prohibition is general") that the militia clause was not intended to restrict the scope of the right.

(In 1791 William Rawle was appointed United States Attorney for Pennsylvania by President George Washington, a post he held for more than eight years.)

Yet another jurist, Justice Story (appointed to the Supreme Court as an Associate Justice by James Madison in 1811), wrote a constitutional commentary in 1833 ("Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States"). Regarding the Second Amendment, he wrote (source):

The next amendment is: "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

The importance of this article will scarcely be doubted by any persons, who have duly reflected upon the subject. The militia is the natural defence of a free country against sudden foreign invasions, domestic insurrections, and domestic usurpations of power by rulers. It is against sound policy for a free people to keep up large military establishments and standing armies in time of peace, both from the enormous expenses, with which they are attended, and the facile means, which they afford to ambitious and unprincipled rulers, to subvert the government, or trample upon the rights of the people. The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them.

As the Tennessee Supreme Court in Andrews v. State (1871) explains, this "passage from Story, shows clearly that this right was intended, as we have maintained in this opinion, and was guaranteed to, and to be exercised and enjoyed by the citizen as such, and not by him as a soldier, or in defense solely of his political rights."

Story adds:

And yet, though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of a well regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised, that among the American people there is a growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a strong disposition, from a sense of its burthens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed without some organization, it is difficult to see. There is certainly no small danger, that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our national bill of rights.

Story laments the people's lack of enthusiasm for maintaining a well-regulated militia. However, some anti-gun rights advocates misinterpret this entire passage as being "consistent with the theory that the Second Amendment guarantees a right of the people to be armed only when in service of an organized militia." (See Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment for an example of reaching that conclusion by committing a non-sequitur.)

The need for a well-regulated militia and an armed citizenry are not mutually exclusive, nor was the right to have arms considered dependent on membership in an active militia (more on that later). Rather, as illustrated by Tucker, Rawle, and Story, the militia clause and the right to arms were intended to be complementary.

More Evidence Supporting an Individual Right

After James Madison's Bill of Rights was submitted to Congress, Tench Coxe (see also: Tench Coxe and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 1787-1823) published his "Remarks on the First Part of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution," in the Federal Gazette, June 18, 1789 He asserts that it's the people (as individuals) with arms, who serve as the ultimate check on government:

As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people duly before them, may attempt to tyrannize, and as the military forces which must be occasionally raised to defend our country, might pervert their power to the injury of their fellow-citizens, the people are confirmed by the next article in their right to keep and bear their private arms.

"A search of the literature of the time reveals that no writer disputed or contradicted Coxe's analysis that what became the Second Amendment protected the right of the people to keep and bear 'their private arms.' The only dispute was over whether a bill of rights was even necessary to protect such fundamental rights." (Halbrook, Stephen P. "The Right of the People or the Power of the State Bearing Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second Amendment". Originally published as 26 Val. U. L.Rev. 131-207, 1991).

Earlier, in The Pennsylvania Gazette, Feb. 20, 1788, while the states were considering ratification of the Constitution, Tench Coxe wrote:

Who are the militia? are they not ourselves. Is it feared, then, that we shall turn our arms each man against his own bosom. Congress have no power to disarm the militia. Their swords, and every other terrible implement of the soldier, are the birth-right of an American...The unlimited power of the sword is not in the hands of either the federal or state governments but, where I trust in God it will ever remain, in the hands of the people.

The Federalist Papers

Alexander Hamilton in Federalist, No. 29, did not view the right to keep arms as being confined to active militia members:

What plan for the regulation of the militia may be pursued by the national government is impossible to be foreseen...The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as futile as it would be injurious if it were capable of being carried into execution... Little more can reasonably be aimed at with the respect to the people at large than to have them properly armed and equipped ; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.

James Madison in Federalist No. 46 wrote:

Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments,to which the people are attached, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by these governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it.

Here, like Story, Madison is expressing the idea that additional advantages accrue to the people when the citizens' right to arms is enhanced by having an organized and properly directed militia.

The Federalist Papers Continued – "The Original Right of Self-Defense"

The Founders realized insurrections may occur from time to time and it is the militia's duty to suppress them. They also realized that however remote the possibility of usurpation was, the people with their arms, had the right to restore their republican form of government by force, if necessary, as an extreme last resort.

"The original right of self-defense" is not a modern-day concoction. We now examine Hamilton's Federalist No. 28. Hamilton begins:

That there may happen cases in which the national government may be necessitated to resort to force cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes exist in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body; that the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which we have been told is the only admissible principle of republican government) has no place but in the reveries of these political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction.

Hamilton explains that the national government may occasionally need to quell insurrections and it is certainly justified in doing so.

Hamilton continues:

If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no recourse left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of government, and which against the usurpations of the national rulers may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success than against those of the rulers of an individual State. In a single State, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct government in each, can take no regular measures for defense. The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except in their courage and despair.

Hamilton clearly states there exists a right of self-defense against a tyrannical government, and it includes the people with their own arms and adds:

[T]he people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress. How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized!

Thus the militia is the ultimate check against a state or the national government. That is why the founders guaranteed the right to the people as opposed to only active militia members or a state's militia. But of course, via the militia clause, the Second Amendment acknowledges, as well, the right of a state to maintain a militia. (For more on militia see: http://guncite.com/gc2ndmea.html.)

Hamilton concludes, telling us the above scenario is extremely unlikely to occur:

When will the time arrive that the federal government can raise and maintain an army capable of erecting a despotism over the great body of the people of an immense empire, who are in a situation, through the medium of their State governments, to take measures for their own defense, with all the celerity, regularity, and system of independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a disease, for which there can be found no cure in the resources of argument and reasoning.

Again, it is the recurring theme of the people's right to keep and bear arms as individuals, enhanced by a militia system, that (in part) provides for the "security of a free state."

Connecting the Dots...

"The opinion of the Federalist has always been considered as of great authority. It is a complete commentary on our Constitution, and is appealed to by all parties in the questions to which that instrument has given birth. . . . "
--- The U.S. Supreme Court in Cohens v. Virginia (1821)

Although the Federalist Papers were written prior to the drafting of the Bill of Rights (but after the Constitution was sent to the states for ratification), the passages quoted, above, help explain the relationships that were understood between a well-regulated militia, the people, their governments, and the right to keep and bear arms. The Second Amendment did not declare or establish any new rights or novel principles.

The Purpose of the Militia Clause

"Collective rights theorists argue that addition of the subordinate clause qualifies the rest of the amendment by placing a limitation on the people's right to bear arms. However, if the amendment truly meant what collective rights advocates propose, then the text would read "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the States to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." However, that is not what the framers of the amendment drafted. The plain language of the amendment, without attenuate inferences therefrom, shows that the function of the subordinate clause was not to qualify the right, but instead to show why it must be protected. The right exists independent of the existence of the militia. If this right were not protected, the existence of the militia, and consequently the security of the state, would be jeopardized." (U.S. v. Emerson, 46 F.Supp.2d 598 (N.D.Tex. 1999))

For more information about justification clauses see: Volokh, Eugene, The Commonplace Second Amendment, (73 NYU L. Rev. 793 (1998)). (See also, Kopel, David, Words of Freedom, National Review Online, May 16, 2001.)

Parting Shots

There are 3 ways the Second Amendment is usually interpreted to deny it was intended to protect an individual right to keep and bear arms:

It protects a state's right to keep and bear arms.
The right is individual, but limited to active militia members because the militia clause narrows the right's scope.
The term "people" refers to the people collectively, rather than the people as individuals.

Yet, three jurists, who were contemporaries of the Founders, and wrote constitutional commentaries, read the Second Amendment as protecting a private, individual right to keep arms. There is no contrary evidence from that period (see Guncite's Is there contrary evidence? and Second Amendment challenge).

Instead of the "right of the people," the Amendment's drafters could have referred to the militia or active militia members, as they did in the Fifth Amendment, had they meant to restrict the right. (Additionally, see GunCite's page here showing evidence that the term, "people," as used in the Bill of Rights, referred to people as individuals.)

It strains credulity to believe the aforementioned three jurists misconstrued the meaning of the Second Amendment.

The only model that comports with all of the evidence from the Founding period is the one interpreting the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right for a collective purpose. The militia clause and the right to keep and bear arms were intended to be complementary.

Perversely, gun rights defenders are accused of creating a Second Amendment myth, when it is some present-day jurists and historians who have failed to give a full account of the historical record.

(The assertion that the Second Amendment was intended to protect an individual right should not be confused with the claim that all gun control is un-constitutional. However, to read why many gun rights advocates oppose most gun controls, today, please see GunCite's, Misrepresenting the Gun Control Debate.)

http://www.guncite.com/gc2ndpur.html

The Meaning of the Words in the Second Amendment

The Second Amendment:

A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.

Militia

The word "militia" has several meanings. It can be a body of citizens (no longer exclusively male) enrolled for military service where full time duty is required only in emergencies. The term also refers to the eligible pool of citizens callable into military service. (dictionary.com)

The federal government can use the militia for the following purposes as stated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution:

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;

Is today's National Guard the militia? It is a part of the well-regulated militia.[1] (As mentioned in GunCite's, The Original Intent and Purpose of the Second Amendment, it was not the intent of the framers to restrict the right to keep arms to only those serving active militia duty.)

For a definition of today's militia as defined, by statute, in the United States Code, click here.

A militia is always subject to federal, state, or local government control. A "private" militia or army not under government control could be considered illegal and in rebellion, and as a result subject to harsh punishment. (See Macnutt, Karen L., Militias, Women and Guns Magazine, March, 1995.)

Some argue that since the militias are "owned," or under the command of the states, that the states are free to disarm their militia if they so choose, and therefore of course no individual right to keep arms exists. The Militia is not "owned," rather it is controlled, organized, et. cetera, by governments. The federal government as well as the states have no legitimate power to disarm the people from which militias are organized. Unfortunately, few jurists today hold this view. (See Reynolds, Glen Harlan, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461-511 [1995].)

A brief summary of early U.S. militia history.

Well Regulated

The Random House College Dictionary (1980) gives four definitions for the word "regulate," which were all in use during the Colonial period and one more definition dating from 1690 (Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Edition, 1989). They are:

1) To control or direct by a rule, principle, method, etc.

2) To adjust to some standard or requirement as for amount, degree, etc.

3) To adjust so as to ensure accuracy of operation.

4) To put in good order.

[obsolete sense]

b. Of troops: Properly disciplined. Obs. rare-1.

1690 Lond. Gaz. No. 2568/3 We hear likewise that the French are in a great Allarm in Dauphine and Bresse, not having at present 1500 Men of regulated Troops on that side.

We can begin to deduce what well-regulated meant from Alexander Hamilton's words in Federalist Paper No. 29:

The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as futile as it would be injurious if it were capable of being carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, nor a week nor even a month, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry and of the other classes of the citizens to be under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people and a serious public inconvenience and loss.
--- The Federalist Papers, No. 29.

Hamilton indicates a well-regulated militia is a state of preparedness obtained after rigorous and persistent training. Note the use of 'disciplining' which indicates discipline could be synonymous with well-trained.

This quote from the Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 also conveys the meaning of well regulated:

Resolved , That this appointment be conferred on experienced and vigilant general officers, who are acquainted with whatever relates to the general economy, manoeuvres and discipline of a well regulated army.
--- Saturday, December 13, 1777.

In the passage that follows, do you think the U.S. government was concerned because the Creek Indians' tribal regulations were superior to those of the Wabash or was it because they represented a better trained and disciplined fighting force?

That the strength of the Wabash Indians who were principally the object of the resolve of the 21st of July 1787, and the strength of the Creek Indians is very different. That the said Creeks are not only greatly superior in numbers but are more united, better regulated, and headed by a man whose talents appear to have fixed him in their confidence. That from the view of the object your Secretary has been able to take he conceives that the only effectual mode of acting against the said Creeks in case they should persist in their hostilities would be by making an invasion of their country with a powerful body of well regulated troops always ready to combat and able to defeat any combination of force the said Creeks could oppose and to destroy their towns and provisions.
--- Saturday, December 13, 1777.

I am unacquainted with the extent of your works, and consequently ignorant of the number or men necessary to man them. If your present numbers should be insufficient for that purpose, I would then by all means advise your making up the deficiency out of the best regulated militia that can be got.
--- George Washington (The Writings of George Washington, pp. 503-4, (G.P. Putnam & Sons, pub.)(1889))

The above quote is clearly not a request for a militia with the best set of regulations. (For brevity the entire passage is not shown and this quote should not be construed to imply Washington favored militias, in fact he thought little of them, as the full passage indicates.)

But Dr Sir I am Afraid it would blunt the keen edge they have at present which might be keept sharp for the Shawnese &c: I am convinced it would be Attended by considerable desertions. And perhaps raise a Spirit of Discontent not easily Queld amongst the best regulated troops, but much more so amongst men unused to the Yoak of Military Discipline.
--- Letter from Colonel William Fleming to Col. Adam Stephen, Oct 8, 1774, pp. 237-8. (Documentary History of Dunmore's War, 1774, Wisconsin historical society, pub. (1905))

And finally, a late-17th century comparison between the behavior of a large collection of seahorses and well-regulated soldiers:

One of the Seamen that had formerly made a Greenland Voyage for Whale-Fishing, told us that in that country he had seen very great Troops of those Sea-Horses ranging upon Land, sometimes three or four hundred in a Troop: Their great desire, he says, is to roost themselves on Land in the Warm Sun; and Whilst they sleep, they apppoint one to stand Centinel, and watch a certain time; and when that time's expir'd, another takes his place of Watching, and the first Centinel goes to sleep, &c. observing the strict Discipline, as a Body of Well-regulated Troops
--- (Letters written from New-England, A. D. 1686. P. 47, John Dutton (1867))

The quoted passages support the idea that a well-regulated militia was synonymous with one that was thoroughly trained and disciplined, and as a result, well-functioning. That description fits most closely with the "to put in good order" definition supplied by the Random House dictionary. The Oxford dictionary's definition also appears to fit if one considers discipline in a military context to include or imply well-trained.

What about the Amendment's text itself? Considering the adjective "well" and the context of the militia clause, which is more likely to ensure the security of a free state, a militia governed by numerous laws (or the proper amount of regulation [depending on the meaning of "well"] ) or a well-disciplined and trained militia? This brief textual analysis also suggests "to put in good order" is the correct interpretation of well regulated, signifying a well disciplined, trained, and functioning militia.

And finally, when regulated is used as an adjective, its meaning varies depending on the noun its modifying and of course the context. For example: well regulated liberty (properly controlled), regulated rifle (adjusted for accuracy), and regulated commerce (governed by regulations) all express a different meaning for regulated. This is by no means unusual, just as the word, bear, conveys a different meaning depending on the word it modifies: bearing arms, bearing fruit, or bearing gifts.

Security of a Free State

Most likely "security of a free State" is synonymous with "security of a free country," as opposed to security of one of the States of the Union against federal oppression (see UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh's commentary).

The People

As ample evidence illustrates below, the people, as referred to in the Constitution at the time it was written, was synonymous with citizens. Also shown below, some scholars mistakenly assume that when the Constitution refers to "the people," a collective right or entity is referenced. However, that notion is incorrect. When the term "the people" is used, it could be referring to a right that is exercised individually, collectively, or both, depending on context. Of course, the meaning of the term "the people" is the same regardless.

Why wasn't "person" or "persons" used instead of "the people" when enumerating certain individual rights? "Persons," as referred to in the Constitution, signified a wider class of people than citizens. Persons included slaves. For example, Article 2, clause 3 of the Constitution refers to slaves as persons, but they were never considered as citizens or a part of the people: "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons." (U.S. Constitution)

The Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights begins:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated..."

"The people" in the Fourth Amendment obviously refers to an individual right. (The phrase "in their persons" means people themselves [their bodies] cannot be unreasonably seized or searched. Compare the 14th Amendment from Virginia's proposed declaration of rights to the Constitution [also written by James Madison] to the 4th Amendment: "That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his papers..." "Persons" in the 4th Amendment is used to match the plural "people.")

One of James Madison's proposed amendments:

"The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable."

Would anybody in their right mind suggest Madison proposed a collective right to speak, write, or publish their thoughts?

Looking at other declarations of rights from the time clearly shows "the people," being used in conjunction with the enumeration of indvidual rights.

For example, Article XIII of Pennsylvania's 1776 Declaration of Rights states:

"That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state..."

Article XII from the same declaration says:

"That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to be restrained."

In both of the above examples, "the people" means each citizen. Would anyone seriously suggest that Article XII protects only a "collective right," or that the people's freedom of speech and writing is limited to those who posses a printing press or to works appearing in the news media?

Yet, there are those claiming "it is far from obvious that the meaning of the phrase 'defense of themselves' should be interpreted as a statement of individual rights.'" (Saul Cornell, "Don't Know Much About History" at p. 674. See also pp. 675-77.)

Cornell states, "One of the most serious problems with individual rights theory is that it makes it impossible to understand why some states embraced a new formulation of the right to bear arms in the nineteenth century. Rather than assert a right to 'bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state,' the new Jacksonian constitutional formulation of this right asserted that 'each person has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.' Indeed, the shift in language between the Founding Era and the Jacksonian period itself provides one of the best arguments against reading the earlier languague as advancing an individual right. There would have been little need to adopt the new formulation if the old one were widely understood to protect an individual right." (Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment at pp. 1140-41)

Unfortunately for anti-individual rights advocates the historical record refutes "one of the best arguments:"

Pennsylvania kept that same clause in a 1790 revision as follows: "That the right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not be questioned." James Wilson, president of the convention which adopted that provision, a leading Federalist, and later Supreme Court Justice, explained it in a discussion of homicide "when it is necessary for the defence of one's person or house." He continued:

it is the great natural law of self preservation, which, as we have seen, cannot be repealed, or superseded, or suspended by any human institution. This law, however, is expressly recognised in the constitution of Pennsylvania. "The right of the citizens to bear arms in the defence of themselves shall not be questioned." This is one of our many renewals of the Saxon regulations. "They were bound," says Mr. Selden, "to keep arms for the preservation of the kingdom, and of their own persons." [Web source of Wilson quote]

(Stephen Halbrook, St. George Tucker's Second Amendment at p. 18)

For further refutation of the notion that "in defense of themselves" was referring to a collective right or one that was entirely military see Randy Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia? at pp. 22-3.

Again looking at Virginia's proposed declaration of rights, from the preamble:

"That there be a Declaration or Bill of Rights asserting and securing from encroachment the essential and unalienable Rights of the People in some such manner as the following;"

Article Sixteen:

"That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their Sentiments; but the freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty and ought not to be violated."

Article Sixteen enumerates rights that clearly can be exercised indvidually.

Roger Sherman's draft bill of rights clearly refers to individual rights when referring to the rights of the people (article 2 [at 983]), (Sherman was a Founder, Senator, and lawyer):

"The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them when they enter into Society, such are the rights of Conscience in matters of religion; of acquiring property and of pursuing happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing their Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably assembling to consult their common good, and of applying Government by petition or remonstrance for redress of grievances. Of these rights therefore they Shall not be deprived by the Government of the united states."

From the Articles of Confederation:

"The people of each State shall free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce..."

Hopefully the reader does not interpret the above as referring to a collective right to travel.

Yet, Yale law professor Akhil Amar claims, "when the Constitution speaks of 'the people' rather than 'persons,' the collective connotation is primary" (Second Thoughts: What the right to bear arms really means). Amar's theory unravels when looking at all of the evidence. He tries to reconcile a portion of it writing, "The Fourth Amendment is trickier... And these words obviously focus on the private domain, protecting individuals in their private homes more than in the public square. Why, then, did the Fourth use the words 'the people' at all? Probably to highlight the role that jurors--acting collectively and representing the electorate--would play in deciding which searches were reasonable and how much to punish government officials who searched or seized improperly."

Amar's reasoning might sound plausible in today's context, however he fails to provide an appropriate example. In 1789 jurors did not issue warrants or determine whether a search was reasonable and they could not "punish government officials who searched or seized improperly." There was no method of suing the government in 1789 for damages resulting from the violation of civil rights. Also Amar fails to explain Madison's draft amendment protecting the people's right to speak and write, mentioned above.

Regardless of what the duties and responsibilities of juries were in 1789, Amar apparently does not realize that in the Constitution, person, without further qualification, refers to a wider class of individuals than the people.

Some individual rights were protected for collective purposes, the Second Amendment being one of them. However this doesn't transform the individual right into a collective right belonging to the states or the militia. Keeping arms was a right that could be exercised individually or collectively.

Compare Amar's opinion with that of Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe's:

[The Second Amendment's] central purpose is to arm "We the People" so that ordinary citizens can participate in the collective defense of their community and their state. But it does so not through directly protecting a right on the part of states or other collectivities, assertable by them against the federal government, to arm the populace as they see fit. Rather the amendment achieves its central purpose by assuring that the federal government may not disarm individual citizens without some unusually strong justification consistent with the authority of the states to organize their own militias. That assurance in turn is provided through recognizing a right (admittedly of uncertain scope) on the part of individuals to possess and use firearms in the defense of themselves and their homes--not a right to hunt for game, quite clearly, and certainly not a right to employ firearms to commit aggressive acts against other persons--a right that directly limits action by Congress or by the Executive Branch and may well, in addition, be among the privileges or immunities of United States citizens protected by � 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment against state or local government action.
(Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law 902 n.221 [3d ed. 2000] [emphasis added]. [Online references here and here.])

Even this anti-individual right law journal article finds, "As to the broader context of usage within the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, those documents use "the people" in both senses: sometimes collectively, sometimes individually." (Also see note 5 for further discussion, concluding, "In short, contrary to claims often made on both sides of the debate, the Second Amendment's reference to 'the people' does not, simply as a textual matter, commit us to either an individual or a collective right interpretation of the Amendment.")

Lastly, even the Supreme Court agrees on the meaning of "the people" as used in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

"The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included..." (Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 [1856])

And the dissent agrees:

"If we look into the Constitutions and State papers of that period, we find the inhabitants or people of these colonies, or the inhabitants of this State, or Commonwealth, employed to designate those whom we should now denominate citizens."

In Adamson v. California, 1947) the Supreme Court refers to the Bill of Rights as protecting individual rights:

"The reasoning that leads to those conclusions starts with the unquestioned premise that the Bill of Rights, when adopted, was for the protection of the individual against the federal government..."

And again the dissent agrees:

"The first 10 amendments were proposed and adopted largely because of fear that Government might unduly interfere with prized individual liberties."

More recently the Supreme Court comments on what "the people" may mean today and its distinction from "person:"

'[T]he people' seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution... While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that 'the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community... (Excludable alien is not entitled to First Amendment rights, because "[h]e does not become one of the people to whom these things are secured by our Constitution by an attempt to enter forbidden by law"). The language of these Amendments contrasts with the words 'person' and 'accused' used in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments regulating procedure in criminal cases." (U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 [1990])

To Keep

To "keep" arms means keeping one's own, private, arms. For example, in response to Madison's proposed amendments, Samuel Nasson, an Antifederalist representative to the Massachusetts ratification convention, in a letter to George Thatcher, a Federalist Representative from Massachusetts, wrote:

I find that Amendments are once again on the Carpet. I hope that such may take place as will be for the Best Interest of the whole[.] A Bill of rights well secured that we the people may know how far we may Proceade in Every Department[,] then their [sic] will be no Dispute between the people and rulers[.] [I]n that may be secured the right to keep arms for Common and Extraordinary Occations such as to secure ourselves against the wild Beast and also to amuse us by fowling and for our Defence against a Common Enemy[.] [Y]ou know to learn the Use of arms is all that can Save us from a forighn foe that may attempt to subdue us[,] for if we keep up the Use of arms and become well acquainted with them we Shall allway be able to look them in the face that arise up against us[,] for it is impossible to Support a Standing armey large Enough to Guard our Lengthy Sea Coast...I think the man that Enters as a Soldier in a time of peace only for a living is only a fit tool to enslave his fellows. (July 9, 1789) (See U.S. v. Emerson and Halbrook)

"The above is the only known correspondence from a constituent to a Congressman which explained the understanding of the proposal that became the Second Amendment (source)." It is clear that Nasson read a broad personal right to keep arms in the proposed amendment, unconditioned upon militia service, and that familiarity and practice with arms enabled the citizenry to effectively oppose an invasion or tyranny by a standing army.

Samuel Mitchill, served in the New York State Assembly, the House of Representatives, and in the Senate. The following is his interpretation of the Second Amendment, excerpted from a speech in 1793 (source).

The establishment of a militia, in which the most able bodied and middle aged men are enrolled and furnished with arms, proceeds upon the principle that they who are able to govern are also capable of defending themselves. The keeping of arms is, therefore, not only not prohibited, but is positively provided by law; and these, when procured, shall not rust for want of employ, but shall be brought into use from time to time, that the owner may grow expert in the handling of them. [emphasis added] The meeting together of the youth now and then to exercise them in arms, and to discipline themselves for reviews at regimental and brigade parades, is intended to infuse a martial spirit and qualify them for defensive operations.

I enter not into the discussion of the question whether such a militia be wisely established or not. I only remark the prudence of the people is such that government is not afraid of putting arms in their hands, and of encouraging expertness in the use of them. These weapons serve for the defence of the life and property of the individual against the violent or burglarious attacks of thieves, a description of persons happily very small among us. [emphasis added] They are ready on hand, if need require, to suppress any mob or insurrection, which, by the bye, is a rare occurrence, that may threaten mischief within the government; and also, by their means, security is afforded against foreign incroachment and invasion; while at the same time, the bearer, unfettered by oppressive game and forest laws, and without the restraint of a license, may amuse himself with hunting and fowling, when he pleases.

These are great privileges, and as such ought to be highly valued; and misery may be expected to follow with hasty strides any attempt to deprive you of them. A comparison of our situation in this respect with the great body of people in other parts of the world cannot fail to turn the balance so completely in our favor that this consideration offers itself as another very cogent reason, very cogent, I say, for prizing this--this--this, Gentlemen, singularly favored country.

Samuel Mitchill, as all known early interpreters of the Second Amendment expressed, the guarantee of the people's pre-existing right to keep and bear arms protected both collective and individual elements to encourage the continuance of the militia.

For refutation of claims that "keep" was not intended to guarantee a private right to arms, see Guncite's "Is there Contrary Evidence?"

To Bear Arms

"Bearing arms," throughout the 18th century, most likely meant to serve as a soldier or to fight (including bearing arms against another man in individual self-defense). Where the term "bear arms" appears, itself, without further modifiers it did not infer a broader meaning such as hunting or the mere carrying or wearing of arms.

For example, Roger Sherman, during House consideration of a militia bill (1790) refers to bearing arms as an individual right of self-defense (against other individuals) as well as a right belonging to the states:

[C]onceived it to be the privilege of every citizen, and one of his most essential rights, to bear arms, and to resist every attack upon his liberty or property, by whomsoever made. The particular states, like private citizens, have a right to be armed, and to defend, by force of arms, their rights, when invaded.
14 Debates in the House of Representatives, ed. Linda Grand De Pauw. (Balt., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1972), 92-3.

Thus the term bearing arms was understood as not referring exclusively to military service.

Although without modifying terms, as mentioned above, bearing arms probably did not refer to the mere carrying or hunting with arms.

The Second Amendment as passed by the House of Representatives read:

A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the People, being the best security of a free State, the right of the People to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed, but no one religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person. (source)

In the conscientious objector clause, "bearing arms" clearly conveys an exclusively military or fighting connotation, and thus it would seem "to bear arms" also has a military meaning. Otherwise, we are talking about different meanings associated with the same word within the same amendment. Highly improbable, especially since most of the framers were lawyers.

If one examines the House discussion of the proposed Second Amendment, it is clear that bearing arms could only have meant military service or fighting. Quakers, as mentioned in the House discussion, were scrupulous of bearing arms. Quakers were allowed to hunt (source), but were opposed to "war against any man" (source).

Further, the comments of Representative Vining (from the House discussion) show that bearing arms was synonymous with fighting:

Mr. Vining hoped the clause would be suffered to remain as it stood, because he saw no use in it if it was amended so as to compel a man to find a substitute, which, with respect to the Government, was the same as if the person himself turned out to fight (source).

Note, the drafters did not use "keeping and bearing" in connection with the conscientious objector clause, although they obviously could have.

Some would argue that serving in a militia wasn't a right, but a duty. In the 18th century it was considered both, as the evidence from two state constitutional provisions (source) unambiguously illustrates:

North Carolina (1776) (unchanged until 1868): "That the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State..."

Massachusetts: (1780): The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence.

Comments from Tench Coxe provide further evidence:

Coxe noted that Pennsylvania excluded free Blacks from "the right to enter militia and to partake of public arms," and that the states "deny them the use of the public arms (source)."

Since the 18th century was filled with war, one might counter that, of course, when the term "bearing arms" was used without accompanying modifiers, its use always referred to martial activities, and as a result there weren't opportunities to refer to bearing arms in a broader context. However, as some of the above examples illustrate, the term was often used where a broader meaning, such as mere carrying, could not be derived (eg., scrupulous of bearing arms). Further, there was plenty of opportunity to use "bearing arms" in a context similar to carrying, but it doesn't appear to have been used that way. "Bearing arms" was used in statutes to forbid blacks or Indians from serving or enrolling in the militia, however when referring to civilian gun use by these same persons, terms such as keep and carry were used. (For example, see St. George Tucker's use of the term "bear arms" and "carrying any gun" in this passage.)

Often, the following, in this case excerpted from U.S. v. Emerson (see Part V [Second Amendment], C [Text], 1 [Substantive Guarantee], b [Bear Arms]), is used as an attempt to show bearing arms was synonymous with carrying:

Also revealing is a bill drafted by Thomas Jefferson and proposed to the Virginia legislature by James Madison (the author of the Second Amendment) on October 31, 1785, that would impose penalties upon those who violated hunting laws if they "shall bear a gun out of his [the violator's] inclosed ground, unless whilst performing military duty."

To bear a gun or bear an arm is a different construction than bearing arms. The former normally refers to the mere carrying of arms rather than actual military service or fighting with arms.

Another, more seriously erroneous, example, also cited by Emerson and others:

A similar indication that "bear arms" was a general description of the carrying of arms by anyone is found in the 1828 edition of Webster's American Dictionary of the English Language; where the third definition of bear reads: "[t]o wear; to bear as a mark of authority or distinction, as, to bear a sword, a badge, a name; to bear arms in a coat."

Concealing a gun in a coat could hardly be considered a mark of authority or distinction. The above reference to "coat," refers to a coat of arms. In the same 1828 dictionary, one of the definitions given for coat is a coat of arms (source). To bear arms in a coat referred to a coat of arms containing some form of arms (example).

The fifth item for the word, bear, in the Johnson Dictionary which precedes Webster's by several decades (1755), gives the following definition for bear:

To carry as a mark of distinction. So we say, to bear arms in a coat.

Once again, especially in 1755, carrying a gun inside a coat was not a mark of distinction. The far more likely reference is to a coat of arms.

History professor Robert Shalhope expresses the same concept of keep and bear as described above:

"Americans of the Revolutionary generation distinguished between the individual's right to keep arms and the need for a militia in which to bear them. Yet it is equally clear that more often than not they considered these rights inseparable." Shalhope then refers to James Madison's Federalist No. 46 where "Madison drew the usual contrast between the American states, where citizens were armed, and European nations, where governments feared to trust their citizens with arms. Then he observed that 'it is not certain that with this aid alone [possession of arms], they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will, and direct the national force; and of officers appointed out of the militia, by these governments and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned, in spite of the legions which surround it.'" (The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment at p. 611)

Neither was Shalhope's law journal article the first to express such a view (see The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, Harvard Law Review, (1915), by Lucilius Emery).[2]

Arms

In Colonial times "arms" usually meant weapons that could be carried. This included knives, swords, rifles and pistols. Dictionaries of the time had a separate definition for "ordinance" (as it was spelled then) meaning cannon. Any hand held, non-ordnance type weapons, are theoretically constitutionally protected. Obviously nuclear weapons, tanks, rockets, fighter planes, and submarines are not.

This off-site essay offers a differing and reasonable view that arms in the late 18th Century did mean the full array of arms and offers how that definition can be applied today "honestly (and constitutionally)."
NOTES

[1] For some strange reason, many gun-rights activists insist that the National Guard is not a militia. This just plays into the hands of those claiming the Second Amendment is obsolete, in-part, because there is no longer a mlitia (also it mistakenly lends credence to the idea that gun ownership is predicated on militia membership).

When in the service of the states, guardsmen function as militia. Once a member of a State Guard unit is ordered into active military service of the United States, that person is no longer under the command of, or serving, a State Guard unit (until they are relieved from federal service), but is now a member of the army. (See the Supreme Court case Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990). Perpich also provides a brief but good explanation of the evolution of the National Guard statutes.)

In other words, even today, the states still maintain a militia system, however the federal government, at this time is not utilizing the state militias, as militias, when state militia members are called into federal service.

Typical objections to the contention that the National Guard, when in the service of the states, is not a milita:

The National Guard is authorized by federal legislation and supported, and armed, entirely by federal funds.
The source of a militia's funding is irrelevant as to whether an organization is considered a militia. Rufus King, a Massachusetts delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, when discussing the meaning of the Militia Clause in the Constitution said, "arming meant not only to provide for uniformity of arms, but included the authority to regulate the modes of furnishing, either by the militia themselves, the state governments, or the national treasury..." (Elliot's Debates) This founder's statement clearly shows that regardless of how the militia was armed, it was still a militia.

Nowadays civilians are generally not allowed to keep military arms, but that is a separate issue. Originally, regardless of how the militia was armed, the Second Amendment was ratified to ensure the right of the people to keep their own arms (after all, federally supplied arms could be withdrawn).

Gubernatorial consent is not necessary for Congress to call state guard troops into active duty training
Normally yes, however the governor does have veto power in certain cases. The following is from Perpich:

"The Montgomery Amendment deprives the Governors of the power to veto participation in a National Guard of the United States training mission on the basis of any objection to "the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such active duty." 10 U.S.C. 672(f). Governors may withhold their consent on other grounds. The Governor and the United States agree that if the federalization of the Guard would interfere with the State Guard's ability to address a local emergency, that circumstance would be a [496 U.S. 334, 352] valid basis for a gubernatorial veto."

"Under the interpretation of the Montgomery Amendment advanced by the federal parties, it seems that a governor might also properly withhold consent to an active duty order if the order were so intrusive that it deprived the State of the power to train its forces effectively for local service."

"Under the current statutory scheme, the States are assured of the use of their National Guard units for any legitimate state purpose. They are simply forbidden to use their control over the state National Guard to thwart federal use of the NGUS for national security and foreign policy objectives with which they disagree."

Congressional statute allows states to form a militia that is exempt from being drafted into federal service. If the State National Guard is the modern militia, then how does the separate state militia fit into the mix?

Of course the National Guard is a part of the militia and so are the state defense forces, but, again from Perpich:

"The Governor contends that the state defense forces are irrelevant to this case because they are not subject to being called forth by the National Government and therefore cannot be militia within the meaning of the Constitution. We are not, however, satisfied that this argument is persuasive. First, the immunity of those forces from impressment into the national service appears - if indeed they have any such immunity - to be the consequence of a purely statutory choice...Second, although we do not believe it necessary to resolve the issue, the Governor's construction of the relevant statute is subject to question. It is true that the state defense forces 'may not be called, ordered, or drafted into the armed forces.' 32 U.S.C. 109(c). It is nonetheless possible that they are subject to call under 10 U.S.C. 331-333, which distinguish the 'militia' from the 'armed forces,' and which appear to subject all portions of the 'militia' - organized or not - to call if needed for the purposes specified in the Militia Clauses."

As Perpich notes, even individual members of state self-defense forces are not exempt from a draft (see sec d).

Since the Founding, there was nothing in the Constitution preventing individual militia members from being conscripted into the armed services. Today, it's easier to enlist a larger portion of the militia into the armed services, but apparently, at least according to Perpich, the states are still entitled to have the bulk of their militia (State National Guard) left intact.

(The Supreme Court in MARYLAND v. U.S. (1965) held, "The National Guard is the modern Militia reserved to the States by Art. I. 8, cl. 15, 16, of the Constitution.")

Thus, the National Guard, when in the service of the states, functions exacly as militia, period. The dual status is certainly a twist, but there are built-in checks so the states can still maintain their militia.

[2] Political science professor Robert Spitzer claims the first law journal article to advocate an individual rights interpretation was not published until 1960 (Lost and Found: Researcing the Second Amendment at p. 366) incorrectly reporting Emery's intepretation from the 1915 journal article cited above.

Spitzer writes, the 1960 article "asserted that the Second Amendment supported an individual or personal right to have firearms (notably for personal self-defense), separate and apart from citizen service in a government militia. The second novel argument was that the Second Amendment created a citizen 'right of revolution.'"

Apparently overlooked by Spitzer, Emery's article also writes about this "novel" idea:

But, however concise the language of the provision, it should be construed in connection with the well-known objection to standing armies and the general belief in the need and sufficiency of a well-regulated militia for the defense of the people and the state. Thus construed it is a provision for preserving to the people the right and power of organized military defense of themselves and the state and of organized military resistance to unlawful acts of the government itself, as in the case of the American Revolution.

Spitzer also misinterprets Emery's view of the right to bear arms as if he were writing about the entire Second Amendment:

Authored by noted constitutional scholar Lucilius Emery... Emery quotes Presser, and concludes that "only persons of military capacity to bear arms in military organizations are within the spirit of the guaranty [i.e., the Second Amendment]." Emery ends by saying that "the carrying of weapons by individuals may be regulated, restricted, and even prohibited according as conditions and circumstances may make it necessary for the protection of the people." Emery's article was widely reprinted.

Note that Spitzer has inserted the comment "i.e., the Second Amendment," in brackets, when Emery writes of the "guaranty." However Emery is specifically referring to bearing arms rather than keeping arms ("keep" is addressed in a proceeding paragraph and discussed here shortly).

Spitzer, by ignoring Emery's comments on the meaning of keep, erroneously concludes the article reflects:

What is here labeled the "court" view of the Second Amendment - namely, that the Second Amendment affects citizens only in connection with citizen service in a government-organized and regulated militia.

Emery's comments regarding "the guaranty:"

The constitutional guaranty of a right to bear arms does not include weapons not usual or suitable for use in organized civilized warfare, such as dirks, bowie knives, sling shot, brass knuckles, etc., and the carrying of such weapons may be prohibited. Only persons of military capacity to bear arms in military organizations are within the spirit of the guaranty. Women, young boys, the blind, tramps, persons non compos mentis, or dissolute in habits, may be prohibited from carrying weapons. All persons may be forbidden to carry concealed weapons. Military arms may not be carried in all places even by persons competent to serve in the militia. They may be excluded from courts of justice, polling places, school houses, churches, religious and political meetings, legislative halls and the like. (emphasis added)

However, the paragraph prior to the above states:

From the foregoing premises I think there are deducible several propositions as to the power of the legislature to restrict and even forbid carrying weapons by individuals, however powerless it may be as to the simple possessing or keeping weapons (emphasis added).

The last sentence in the article concludes:

In fine, I venture the opinion that, without violence to the constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to bear arms, the carrying of weapons by individuals may be regulated, restricted, and even prohibited according as conditions and circumstances may make it necessary for the protection of the people.

Once again Emery states severe restrictions may be placed on the "guraranty" of the right to bear arms, not the Second Amendment as a whole. Legislatures were "powerless" to restrict or prohibit weapons possession. Therefore, it is obvious Emery makes a distinction between keeping and bearing arms rather than viewing the phrase as "unitary." In Emery's view, the keeping of arms is not necessarily connected "with citizen service in a government-organized and regulated militia."


http://www.guncite.com/gc2ndmea.html

k.

Let's quote the 2nd Amendment to the US Constitution again, so you can easier understand what I'm about to describe.

"A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed."

If you remember the stuff you learned in grammar school, you'll realize that the first half of the sentence (everything before the comma) is a subordinate clause, aka dependent clause. It is not the actual idea being conveyed, but rather "extra information", so to speak. The actual idea being conveyed is in the second half (after the comma).

How do I know this? Once again, we go back to grammar school. The teacher probably told you to cover up parts of the sentence, and see if they are complete sentences in and of themselves. And if one part can be used as a complete sentence by itself, while another part cannot, then the part that stands by itself as a sentence is the actual meaning being conveyed.

So let's dissect the Second Amendment that I quoted above. Let's first look at the first half (the subordinate clause).

"A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State..."

That is not a complete sentence. Now, let's look at the second half.

"The right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed."

That is a complete sentence.

Since the first half of the Second Amendment is not a sentence, but the second half is, it means the first half is grammatically subordinate to the second half (a subordinate clause). In other words, the actual meaning of the sentence is in the second half. The first half is additional information.

I'm pretty sure the people who wrote our Constitution knew their grammar. So I think it's safe to assume the wording of the militia clause was intentionally written as a subordinate clause.

And thankfully, it seems the US Supreme Court knows their grammar as well. Because they came to the same conclusion.

[This message has been edited by Blacktree (edited 02-16-2014).]

quote Originally posted by Blacktree: Let's quote the 2nd Amendment to the US Constitution again, so you can easier understand what I'm about to describe. "A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed." If you remember the stuff you learned in grammar school, you'll realize that the first half of the sentence (everything before the comma) is a subordinate clause, aka dependent clause. It is not the actual idea being conveyed, but rather "extra information", so to speak. The actual idea being conveyed is in the second half (after the comma). How do I know this? Once again, we go back to grammar school. The teacher probably told you to cover up parts of the sentence, and see if they are complete sentences in and of themselves. And if one part can be used as a complete sentence by itself, while another part cannot, then the part that stands by itself as a sentence is the actual meaning being conveyed. So let's dissect the Second Amendment that I quoted above. Let's first look at the first half (the subordinate clause). "A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State..." That is not a complete sentence. Now, let's look at the second half. "The right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed." That is a complete sentence. Since the first half of the Second Amendment is not a sentence, but the second half is, it means the first half is grammatically subordinate to the first half (a subordinate clause). In other words, the actual meaning of the sentence is in the second half. The first half is additional information. I'm pretty sure the people who wrote our Constitution knew their grammar. So I think it's safe to assume the wording of the militia clause was intentionally written as a subordinate clause. And thankfully, it seems the US Supreme Court knows their grammar as well. Because they came to the same conclusion.

Great explanation. I'm going to use this!

quote Originally posted by Blacktree:

Excellent analysis. Spot on.

A question. How can it be that in

Amendment IV

The right of the people to be secure . . .

Amendment V

No person shall be held to answer . . .

Amendment VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy . . .

the right of the people is an individual right, not to be infringed by the federal government, while the Second Amendment is held by the statists because of the militia clause to be a collective right? The right of the people has to be an individual right through out.

Amendment X specifically states:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, . . . or to the people. . The power to regulate gun ownership is not delegated to the federal government anywhere in the Constitution so it cannot deny an individual right to own a weapon.

quote Originally posted by heybjorn: Excellent analysis. Spot on.

It was excellent but he missed it by (in my best Maxwell Smart voice) "that much".

quote Originally posted by heybjorn: A question. How can it be that in ...

My interpretation from another thread ...

quote Originally posted by cliffw: I say the "right of the people" to keep and bear arms is dependent with the rights of the people granted by their individual states. Every state has it's own constitution. Odd that we are free to leave a state but we are not free to leave the union, . The "rights of the people" actually is a means for state rights, which is clearly recognized by the US Constitution. Perhaps Texas doesn't want me to have my own nuclear bomb. I say Texas can become it's own nuclear power. Way earlier in this thread someone suggested it was pointless to have a right to "pea shooters" as we were already overwhelmed by the firepower of our central government. It doesn't have to be that way. Boundaries do not have to be restrictive.